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ABSTRACT
In the fall of 2008, the United States and the rest of the world experienced significant
financial turmoil. The financial industry as we knew it crumbled before our eyes. After
experiencing this event and the media's fragmented and inconsistent coverage of it, I felt an
interesting topic to look into was the financial press' failed coverage of the finance industry,
both today and in the past. In looking at this event, I will focus on both the financial press that
failed to cover the happenings of the financial industry, as well as those that did recognize the
issue at hand. In doing this, I will include a content analysis of the relevant sections of The
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. In addition, I will also look into past financial
crises, including the Enron scandal, the Savings and Loan crisis, and the Technology Bubble
to see if the financial press' recent failure is the continuation of a long trend. After discussing
the fragmented nature of the financial press, I will then discuss why the financial press had
little effect on individuals, despite some actually good coverage existing. In discussing this
issue, I will focus on topics such as the media’s lack of objectivity and the audience's
unwillingness to accept the situations they are presented with. Finally, I will suggest ways to
rectify this situation, such as news consumers becoming more media literate.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1986, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, a price-weighted average of 30
significant stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq that is generally
thought to reflect the overall performance of the market, the index has had a number of
historic down years. For example, in 1907 the index lost 37.7%, and in 1931 the index lost
52.7% (Hulbert). However, in recent years, the market has set record highs and consumers
have become accustomed to “easy money,” expecting loans even if their credit quality is poor.
As a result, lending practices have become extremely lax and average American consumers
have leveraged themselves to the brink of destruction. Under these conditions, Americans like
Clarence Nathan, whose house was in foreclosure and did not have full-time employment, but
“sounded like a nice guy,” received a loan for $450,000. Moreover, when asked if he would
have lent himself this money, he replied, “I wouldn’t have loaned me the money. And nobody
I know would have loaned me the money. I know guys who are criminals who wouldn’t loan
me that, and they break kneecaps” (Carr). Thus, a disconnect in the lending markets has
undoubtedly developed during these years, and the subprime mortgage crisis was its eventual
result.
In 2008, the effects of faulty lending became obvious for the first time as the subprime
mortgage mess began to unfold due to a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and
foreclosures in the United States and the corresponding impact these events had for banks
around the globe. Although the severity of the subprime mortgage mess was becoming
increasingly clear because of the number of defaults, the media failed to provide substantial
and accurate coverage of this event. Moreover, when the media did provide coverage of the
financial crisis of 2008, it was often too late and extremely fragmented. The failure of the
media, however, was not confined to the financial crisis of 2008. When looking at past crises
in the financial industry, including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the Technology Bubble,
and the Savings and Loan Crisis, it is evident that this has been an ongoing trend. The media
have consistently failed to provide adequate coverage of catastrophic events in the investment
industry. However, although it is evident that the coverage of financial crisis has been
fragmented and often inaccurate, some coverage of these events did exist. Therefore, what
-2-

Where Were the Media in the Financial Crisis of 2008, and Have We Seen This Trend
Before?
Senior Capstone Project for Margaret Dickinson
then is really the problem? How is it possible that investors and the public at large have
repeatedly been caught off-guard by these events? In this report I will not only cover the
media’s failed coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, and past crises including the downfall
of Enron, the Technology Bubble, and the Savings and Loan Crisis, but I will also look at
what other factors are at play and what consumers can do to prevent these failures in the
future.

COVERAGE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES OF 2008
When looking at the months leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, it is evident that the
media’s coverage was inadequate. During this time, coverage of the industry was minimal
despite increasing indicators pointing towards a downfall of a number of long-standing
financial institutions and the eventual onset of the financial crisis. The media neglected to
focus on the issue regardless of the damaging impact a downturn in the investment industry
would have on the public. Furthermore, not only did the media provide extremely limited
coverage of the financial crisis, but the sparse coverage that did exist was insufficient. The
coverage provided was often inaccurate, frequently consisting of diluted explanations of the
situation and biased reports. Furthermore, the information provided was often fragmented and
underestimated the severity of the situation. Consequently, due to the actions of the media
during this event, the coverage of the financial crisis was insufficient, and it ultimately
resulted in the public being severely harmed by the actions of the financial industry.
During the meltdown of the financial markets, reporters were extremely cautious in how they
presented the issue. However, reporters covering this event were not overly cautious “because
reporters should always choose their words with care, but because financial companies are
‘uniquely vulnerable’ to a ‘loss of confidence’ due to rumor, speculation, and fear” (Jackson).
Thus, reporters did not want to be seen as creating a self-fulfilling prophecy; reporters did not
want financial institutions to fail because they implied there was the potential for this to
happen. However, in using this increased level of caution, reporters ultimately did not fulfill
their designated roll of accurately informing the public. The public during this time was
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presented with imprecise information that did not accurately reflect the severity of the issues
surrounding the financial industry.
Because of their ability to cripple the financial industry, reporters during the financial crisis of
2008 did not provide an accurate description of the turmoil within the investment world. As
Richard Perez-Pena stated in an article for The New York Times, “So in most news, stocks
have ‘slid’ and markets ‘gyrated’ but not ‘crashed.’ Companies have ‘tottered’ and ‘struggled’
rather than moved toward failure and bankruptcy” (Perez-Pena). Thus, in order to downplay
the severity of the situation, reporters chose less aggressive words to describe the ongoing
events. Furthermore, as Ali Velshi, a senior business correspondent at CNN, also stated, “’If
someone wants to say the markets are in a free fall, we’ll discuss it first [in production
meetings],’ he said, ‘and the outcome is most likely to be a change in wording’” (Perez-Pena).
Subsequently, as Velshi suggests, reporters would actively change descriptions of events in
order to help minimize the apparent severity. As a result, although reporters may help
minimize the potential for greater financial turmoil by using less severe descriptions of events
in the financial industry, these actions ultimately result in reporters doing the public a
disservice. As reporters, they are supposed to be loyal to the public; the goal of reporters
should be to present unbiased, factual information to their viewers and readers. However,
because reporters during this time were more concerned with protecting the well-being of
financial institutions, they dismissed their allegiance to the public and aligned themselves
with the interests of financial institutions. Ultimately, because of the actions of the media, the
public was not presented with information that truly depicted the condition of the financial
industry.
Not only does the use of less aggressive terminology to describe the occurrence of events in
the investment industry result in the media betraying their allegiance to the public, but it also
brings about the question: “Who’s job is it to tell the public not to panic?” Currently, “’panic’
heads the list of words that major news organizations have avoided using because they are
seen as potentially self-fulfilling” (Perez-Pena). The media refrains from describing a
situation as “panic-ridden” in an attempt to forego increased levels of panic. However, as
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Andrew Serwer, the managing editor of Fortune magazine states, “How do you say ‘There’s
panic out there, but don’t panic?’ And is it even our responsibility to say ‘Don’t panic’?”
(Perez-Pena). Thus, although the media attempt to mitigate the level of panic that occurs, is
this even their responsibility? The role of the media is to present the public with unbiased,
factual information. Thus, rephrasing and reconstructing information in order to prevent panic
is not part of the essential role the media are supposed to fulfill. It is the media’s job to
provide information, and they should not be held responsible for the reaction of the public to
that information. Therefore, in being overly concerned with the reaction of the public when
describing topics such as Lehman Brothers’ dire financial situation, the media diverted from
their primary responsibility and assumed a role that was not theirs to fill.
In addition to the media’s understatement of the financial industry’s condition, the
mainstream media failed to provide extensive coverage as well. Although investing has
become increasingly commonplace among Americans in recent years due to improved
technology and an increase in the usage of 401(k)s, financial news has remained relatively
uncovered among mainstream media; mainstream media have remained overwhelmingly
concerned with covering topics such as the winner of this season’s American Idol or when the
newest version of Apple’s iPhone will be released. Furthermore, mainstream media’s lack of
coverage was not simply because no media outlets were aware of the situation. As Jim
Impoco, a reporter for The New York Times, stated
Even though many financial threats the world faced in recent years were hiding in plain sight – in the pages
of the business press – the broader media’s longstanding indifference to economic views helped keep it
safely out of the public dialogue (Impoco).

Thus, mainstream media’s failure to cover the impending downfall of the financial industry
was not the result of lack of knowledge; it was the result of lack of concern and interest.
Mainstream media’s belief that more “entertaining” topics such as celebrity gossip and
professional sports are more newsworthy than the looming demise of major financial
institutions effectively resulted in many consumers remaining blissfully unaware of the crisis
in the investment industry until it was too late. Ultimately, many consumers were not aware of
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the situation until they had already lost a significant percentage of their savings.
Consequently, it is essential that mainstream media incorporate investment and economic
news into their daily broadcasts in order to ensure that society is not reliant on sources such as
“The Daily Show to take down the next Enron or smoke out the next Bernie Madoff”
(Impoco).
Although the financial press did provide slightly more insight into the financial crisis than did
the mainstream media, the financial press’ tone when it actually did provide coverage also
created mixed signals for the general public. As Ben Steverman, a columnist for Business
Week stated, “The media can contribute to ‘huge swings in optimism and pessimism by
investors’” (Steverman). When conditions seem good, analysts are often excessively
optimistic; whereas, “when things go sour, they outdo each other telling people how bad
things could get” (Steverman). Thus, although the financial press did provide some insight
into the events leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, the tone used to describe these events
was often misleading. The tone of an article or broadcast can lead investors to believe that
something is better or worse than it actually is. Therefore, the emotion of reporters when
relaying messages to the public during this time ultimately played a role in the failure of the
media to accurately convey the situation.
Not only did the media’s tone during the coverage of the financial crisis of 2008 skew the
information, but the biased nature of the media also played a role in making that coverage
insufficient. Following the downfall of a number of major financial institutions and the onset
of the bailout initiative by the government, the media immediately threw their support behind
the bailout. In an instant, the “media decided that anything that the Bush administration and
the congressional leadership viewed as necessary to pass the bill was acceptable behavior”
(Baker and Warner). Despite the fact that the bailout bill was such an important piece of
legislation, the media did not place intense scrutiny on the comments and actions made by
those involved in developing the legislation. The media effectively accepted the information
they were given at face value and failed to press for additional information. Moreover, the
media’s treatment of those individuals opposed to the bill further enforced their biased
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viewpoint of the bailout. Critics of the bill during this time were treated as if they were
“unthinking and ill-educated, even though this group included many of the country’s most
prominent economists” (Baker and Warner). Additionally, on September 24th, 2008 when 230
economists signed an open letter protesting the bailout, the event received almost no coverage
by the mainstream media. Finally, the media’s bias was further enforced by their support of
the Bush Administration’s scare tactics. For example, after the initial defeat of the bailout
package on September 29th, 2008, The Financial Times published an article titled “Congress
Decides It Is Worth Risking Depression.” In the article, the author referred to a repeat of the
Great Depression as a consequence of not passing the bailout bill. Using this threat, however,
was unfounded; it would take a full decade of extremely poorly guided economic policy to
even come close to repeating the Great Depression. The media, continuing their biased nature,
did not bring this fact to the public’s attention. Instead, they reinforced the threat’s impact
and did not bring the public’s attention to the government’s “fear-mongering.” Overall, the
biased nature of media when covering the financial crisis of 2008 was a leading factor
contributing to the event’s poor coverage.
Another contributing factor to the failure in coverage of the financial crisis of 2008 was the
inability of the media to maintain a stance for a significant period of time; the media
constantly “flip flopped” their viewpoints on the issue. For example, during the week of
September 15th, 2008, many of the United States’ economic leaders completely reversed their
viewpoints regarding the condition of the financial industry. During this time, economists
“went from assuring us that the economy was just fine to telling us that the bottom was about
to fall out and a second Great Depression loomed just over the horizon” (Baker and Warner).
Thus, the media effectively reversed their standpoint on the economy for no apparent reason,
leaving the public confused and unsure of the future. In doing so, the media not only tarnished
their reputation as a reputable source of information, but they also failed to provide the public
with accurate information. The media should stand behind their initial viewpoint unless
presented with significant information that refutes it.
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In addition, the media’s inability to maintain a solid viewpoint surrounding the financial
industry’s condition, the media’s tendency to consistently underestimate the potential
“correction” in the market also contributed to the inconsistent coverage of the financial crisis.
Prior to the onset of the demise of the financial industry, “corporate media had already
established themselves as cheerleaders for the thriving housing market” (Casidy). Thus,
because of their position, the media tirelessly supported the housing boom, even when signs
of instability and an emerging housing bubble became evident. As Michael E. Kanell stated in
an article for the Atlanta Journal Constitution in 2003, “Even when they did acknowledge the
posibility of a bubble, given record home prices, media reassured the public that it wasn’t
something to be terribly concnerned about” (Casidy). Furthermore, in 2005 when
construction declined substantially, most media reports continued to deny the existence of a
housing bubble. The media continued to promote and prop-up the housing market despite
rising evidence that its continued expansion was unsustainable. As a result, when the housing
market eventually crashed and the start of the financial crisis of 2008 began to unfold,
investors were taken by surprise and many lost signficant investments. Thus, had the media
accurately reported the condition of the housing market, the public would have had a more
informed understanding of the issue.
Lastly, although the media did provide limited insight into the issues surrounding the financial
industry, what insight they did provide was too late to be effective. For example, while Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were participating in risky investments and the investment banks were
becoming overextended, there were a small number of incremental stories discussing these
issues. However, although there were a few whistle-blowing articles, “the business press
never conveyed a real sense of alarm until institutions began to collapse” (Gasparino).
Therefore, when the media actually began providing coverage of the issue, it was too late for
the general public. Many people had already lost significant investments before they were
even aware of the turmoil in the financial industry. Thus, “as in the savings-and-loan scandal
of the late 1980s, the press was a day late and several dollars short” (Roush).
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Overall, the inadequate coverage of the media during the financial crisis of 2008 resulted in
harmful consequences for the general public. The media’s tendency to use less severe
wording when describing an event and their tendency to underestimate the severity of a
potential “correction” resulted in an essentially unaware public. Furthermore, the fragmented
and biased nature of the media’s coverage further contributed to the public’s lack of
knowledge. Lastly, although there was some coverage of the events unfolding in the
investment industry, this coverage was often too late to be effective. By the time the public
was aware of the situation, individuals had already suffered the effects.

CONTENT ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the method used in the content analysis portion of my quantitative
research, as well as the results of my analysis.
Content Analysis Method
In order to quantify the financial press’ substandard coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, a
content analysis of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times was performed. The first
step in the analysis process was choosing a specific event to examine. Ultimately, the
declaration of bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 was chosen because it
was the first major financial institution to fail. Thus, Lehman’s failure represents the true
culmination of the financial crisis.
Following the selection of an event to analyze, the newspapers for the analysis were then
chosen. In choosing the newspapers for examination, circulation figures for daily newspapers
around the world were retrieved. On the List of the Top-100 Paid for Newspapers in 2008,
compiled by the World Association of Newspapers, The Wall Street Journal and The New
York Times had the highest circulation figures in the United States, behind only USA Today.
The Wall Street Journal had 2.012 million readers, and The New York Times had 1.038
million readers. Although USA Today had the highest circulation figure with 2.293 million
readers, the newspaper was not chosen because it does not include a large business section
(The World Association of Newspapers). Furthermore, The New York Times and The Wall
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Street Journal were also chosen because of their dominance in the business journalism
industry. As stated by Chris Roush in the article “Unheeded Warnings,”
The powerful players in business journalism include the Wall Street Journal, the business sections of the
New York Times and the Washington Post, and business magazines such as BusinessWeek and Fortune.
These are the news outlets with the power to direct the conversation (Roush).

Thus, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times were chosen on the basis of
circulation figures and prominence within the business journalism industry.
After determining which newspapers to utilize, the time period for analysis was then selected.
Due to the short life-span of news topics, a time period of two weeks was ultimately chosen.
As Carl Stepp states in the article Moving at Reckless Speed, “Today’s news media move at
such ‘reckless speed’” (Stepp, 2008). Therefore, it was likely that the Lehman crisis would
only be mentioned during a short period before the actual crash.
In addition to determining the period of analysis, it was also necessary to determine the
relevant sections of each newspaper to examine. Determining the relevant sections was
necessary in order to ensure that the results of the analysis were not skewed. Had irrelevant
sections, such as the Leisure & Arts section of The Wall Street Journal, been included, the
total number of articles used for the calculations would not have been accurate. For example,
the percent of total articles that at least mentioned Lehman would have been smaller because
the total number of articles the percent was calculated from would have been larger. After
manually reviewing both newspapers, the following sections were determined to be relevant:
Wall Street Journal
A: General News
B: Marketplace
C: Money & Investing
B: Money & Investing (Weekend Journal)
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The New York Times
A1-A5: Top Stories/General News
B: Business Day
BU: Business Weekend (Sunday Edition)
In determining the relevant sections, it was ultimately decided not to include the
“International” sections of either newspaper. This decision was based on the fact that within
the business sections, an international business section was included. Therefore, any relevant
international business news would be found in this section and not the actual international
section of the newspaper.
Following the selection of the relevant sections for each newspaper, the relevant articles were
then coded and tallied in order to provide the basis for the desired information. Articles were
determined to be relevant if they merely mentioned the difficulties Lehman Brothers was
facing. Thus, in order to search for all articles mentioning Lehman’s issues during the two
weeks prior to the company’s bankruptcy announcement, Proquest was utilized. However, in
counting the articles, it was necessary to read through each article in order to ensure that the
article was not merely mentioning a Lehman analyst covering another event in the investment
industry, and that the article was truly referencing the impending Lehman crisis. Whereas,
relying solely on the total number of articles the Proquest search provided would have been
detrimental to the accuracy of the data. While tallying the articles, they were also coded
according to the following categories:
Total Number of Articles that Merely Mention Lehman vs. Total Number of Articles
Discussing Solely Lehman
Total Number of Positive Articles vs. Total Number of Negative Articles
Total Number of Times Lehman Articles were on the Front Page
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Total Number of Times the Word “Bankruptcy” was Mentioned
Again, reading each article was necessary in order to ensure the articles were coded correctly.
For example, whether an article was discussing Lehman in a positive or negative light cannot
be determined without first reading the article.
After the coding and tallying of all relevant articles found on Proquest that mentioned the
Lehman controversy in the two weeks immediately before the company’s fall, it was
necessary to determine how many stories overall appeared in each paper. In that way, the
proportion of all stories in the relevant sections that were in fact Lehman-oriented could be
computed. To do this, I selected a seven-day sample of each of my target newspapers and
manually counted all stories in the relevant sections. In this way I was sure to allow for
variations that might have occurred for different days, weekend versus weekday, for example.
Once this number was obtained, I multiplied it by two, which gave me an appropriate
denominator for two weeks of coverage.
Lastly, after compiling the necessary data, Microsoft Excel was then utilized to perform
analysis calculations. Excel was utilized to compute calculations such as the total percentage
of times that Lehman was at least mentioned in the relevant sections of the newspapers, as
well as to construct graphs in order to better visually represent the data.
Overall, by utilizing the aforementioned method, it was possible to gather statistically valid
and representative data that can be used to quantify the media’s fragmented coverage of the
financial crisis of 2008.
Content Analysis Results
Based on the analysis of the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times performed during
the two weeks prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a number of conclusions can be
drawn that support the notion that the financial press’ coverage of the financial crisis of 2008
was inconsistent and minimal.
When comparing the total number of articles that at least mention the situation surrounding
Lehman Brothers to the total number of articles in the relevant sections of both newspapers
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during the two weeks prior to the collapse, it is evident that the coverage of the event was
sparse at best. Of the 1,108 articles located in the relevant section of the newspapers during
this time, only an average of 7.15% mentioned Lehman’s distraught financial situation.
(Please see the chart below.)
Articles that At least Mentioned Lehman in the
Relevant Sections of the Newspapers
WSJ

NY Times

Lehman

58

24

Total

730

378

Percent

7.95%

6.35%

Total Percent

7.15%

This can further be broken down by newspaper, with 7.95% coming from The Wall Street
Journal and 6.35% coming from The New York Times. Thus, it is obvious that the newspapers
did not spend significant time and resources to cover, and ultimately notify the public, the
crisis at hand.
Not only does the fact that only an average of 7.15% of the articles within two of the most
prominent business newspapers actually discussed Lehman support the notion that the
coverage of the financial press is inconsistent, but the extent that these articles cover the topic
supports this conclusion as well. Of the 7.95% of articles in The Wall Street Journal that
actually mention Lehman Brothers, 56.86% of these articles merely mentioned the situation
once. Therefore, the issue was simply mentioned in passing, and it is easy for the reader to
disregard its importance. The remaining 43.14% of the relevant articles discussed solely
Lehman Brothers; the articles were dedicated to discussing the situation at hand in-depth.
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Similar to The Wall Street Journal, the extent to which Lehman Brothers was discussed in
The New York Times also varied. In The New York Times, 33.33% of the articles merely
mentioned the situation, and only 66.67% of the articles discussed solely Lehman Brothers.
Therefore, based on the minimal percentage of articles, both in The Wall Street Journal and
The New York Times, that actually performed an in-depth analysis of the situation, the
existence of minimal media coverage is enforced.
In addition to differing in the extent of coverage, the overall evaluations of the articles also
differed as well. Of the total number of articles across both publications that at least
mentioned the situation surrounding Lehman Brothers, 18.29% of the articles were positive.
Moreover, of the 58 articles in The Wall Street Journal that at least mentioned Lehman
Brother’s situation, 22.41% of the articles were positive. For example, merely two days before
Lehman produced the company’s bankruptcy announcement, an article in The Wall Street
Journal stated that Goldman Sachs continued to maintain a “buy” rating on shares of Lehman
Brothers. By standing behind this rating, Goldman was effectively announcing its continued
confidence in the company. In addition to positive articles being published in The Wall Street
Journal, 8.33% of the articles that at least mentioned Lehman Brothers in The New York
Times were also positive. For example, on September 4th, 2008, an article titled “Investor
Jitters Produce Mixed Markets” stated,
One bright spot in the market Wednesday was the troubled financial sector, which drew some bargain
hunters because of positive news on a few big names: the Ambac Financial Group, Freddie Mac and
Lehman Brothers Holdings (The Associated Press)

Thus, the article was promoting the recent positive news surrounding Lehman, and it was
reflecting on investors still showing interest in investing in the company.
Along with varying article content, the number of times that articles admitted the potential for
Lehman to be forced into bankruptcy also reinforces the substandard nature of the financial
press. Of the 82 total articles that mention the Lehman Brothers crisis, the word “bankruptcy”
was only used twice, once in The Wall Street Journal and once in The New York Times.
Moreover, the remaining articles utilized other, less severe, words to describe Lehman
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Brothers’ situation. Articles used words such as “downfall,” “collapse,” and “decline” instead
of openly stating the possibility of Lehman Brothers declaring bankruptcy. For example, in
the article “Lehman’s Assurances Ring Hollow,” Floyd Norris states, “It is sad to watch
Lehman Brothers, one of the grand old names of Wall Street and before that a cotton and
coffee merchant from Alabama, struggling to avoid collapse” (Norris). Not only does the
author of the article refrain from using the word bankruptcy, but he also softens the severity of
the situation by referring to Lehman as one of the “grand old names of Wall Street.” Thus, by
utilizing less obvious words to describe the situation instead of stating the possibility of
bankruptcy, the vast majority of the articles discussing the Lehman Brothers’ crisis do the
consumers of the financial press a distinct injustice; the financial press did not do an adequate
job of informing consumers of the severity of Lehman Brothers’ situation.
Not only was the word “bankruptcy” seldom mentioned in articles discussing Lehman
Brothers, but articles discussing the crisis were rarely placed on the front page of either
newspaper as well. In The Wall Street Journal, only 8 articles discussing Lehman Brothers
during the two weeks prior to the company’s crash were found on the front page. In addition,
in The New York Times, only 6 articles were found on the front page during the two weeks
prior to the crash. Furthermore, as shown by the chart below, not only did very few articles
appear on the front page, but articles about the situation did not begin appearing on the front
page until September 9th.
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Therefore, articles regarding the topic did not even appear on the front page until the Tuesday
prior to Lehman’s collapse; articles were on the front page for less than a week. Thus, the
press did not adequately identify the situation; the impending downfall of a global financial
institution should receive front-page covereage for more than a few days.
Lastly, the overall timeline of the financial press’ coverage of the crisis is also indicative of its
inadequacy. The impending downfall of a major financial insitution that is linked to
economies around the world is clearly an important issue; however, as the graph below
shows, coverage of the issue was minimal until September 9th.

Until this point, both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times only included an
average of one to two articles a day about the issue. Therefore, it is evident that neither
publication felt the issue was worthy of coverage and did not bother to inform consumers
about the problem. Furthermore, it is also unimaginable to assume that the financial press did
not cover the issue because they were unaware of the situation. As the article Lehman’s Fate
Spurs Emergency Session; Wall Street Titans Seek Ways to Stem Widening Crisis states,
“Lehman’s troubles have also been known for a while, giving market participants ‘time to
prepare,’ according to those familiar with the government’s thinking” (Paletta). Individuals
closely tied to the investments industry were aware of the issues surrounding Lehman
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Brothers; therefore, renowned financial newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal and The
New York Times should have been aware of the concern.
Overall, the results clearly indicate that the financial press’ coverage of major events in the
investment industry, such as the downfall of Lehman Brothers, has been inconsistent and
incomplete. Not only did articles in both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times
fail to convey the severity of the situation, but the coverage did not appear until the very last
possible moment. Both newspapers only provided relatively signifant coverage of the issue
during the week immediately prior to the event. Thus, in the end, as shown by The Wall Street
Journal and The New York Times, the financial press has not done an adequate job of covering
this major event in the investment industry.

COVERAGE OF EARLIER FINANCIAL CRISES
The media’s failure in the financial crisis of 2008, may well be a duplicate of their
performance in past financial crises including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the
Technology Bubble, and the Savings and Loan Crisis.
Enron
During Enron’s reign, the media praised Enron, despite rising evidence of an underlying
scandal. For six straight years, Fortune magazine named Enron the most innovative company
in America. The New York Times called it “a model for the new American workplace,” and
The Dallas Morning News described it as “one of the most envied and respected corporations
in the United States” (Shaw). However, although at times the praise seemed warranted, the
media failed to maintain an objective viewpoint and look behind Enron’s appeared success.
Ultimately, “instead of scrutinizing Enron’s accounts, [the media] acted as a cheerleader all
the way to the end,” and the media’s coverage became inconsistent and disconnected
(Maidment).
While praising Enron’s performance, the media ignored a number of red flags that were
hiding in plain sight. Not only was there a long-lasting, continuous discrepancy between
Enron’s profits and its cash flow, but the company’s return on investment was also extremely
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low for a company with that much risk associated with it. Furthermore, the company’s
financial statements were incomprehensible, even to many of the investment industry’s top
analysts. Additionally, many of the company’s top executives were repeatedly selling huge
amounts of the company’s stock, which should have been a clear indicator that something was
wrong with the company. Not only were top executives selling large amounts of the
company’s stock, but a large number of senior executives were leaving the company as well;
68 senior executives left during an 18 month span. Thus, based on the events that took place,
the media should have been more aware of the impending downfall of Enron.
As a result of the media ignoring the many signs that indicated Enron was not as successful as
it appeared, the media were extremely late in covering the demise of Enron. Despite many
warnings signs, the company was still rated as a “buy” by a number of major brokerage firms
just a few weeks before it declared bankruptcy (Myatt). Subsequently, many investors were in
shock when Enron declared bankruptcy because multiple analysts, who were believed to be
reputable, claimed the company was a strong investment choice. Not only were major
brokerage firms publicizing false buy recommendations, but many major business
publications were also praising Enron’s senior executives during this time as well. For
example, in a Business 2.0 column, “Erick Schonfield acknowledges having made Enron’s
chief executive Jeffrey Skilling its cover boy for the August/September 2001 issue, a week
before he resigned” (Behr). Thus, the media were praising Enron’s senior executives while
they were single-handedly creating a scandal that would ultimately result in the largest
corporate bankruptcy in the history of the United States. Additionally, the media still did not
actively cover Enron even when the company began losing massive amounts of money. The
LA Times, for example, did not publish a story on Enron’s third-quarter loss until two days
after Enron reported the information. Furthermore, even when the LA Times finally did
publish the information, the publication only dedicated four sentences in the markets roundup
portion of the newspaper. Thus, it was obvious that the LA Times did not feel this event was
worthy of extensive coverage, and the “mainstream media certainly waited – too long”
(Myatt).

- 18 -

Where Were the Media in the Financial Crisis of 2008, and Have We Seen This Trend
Before?
Senior Capstone Project for Margaret Dickinson
Not only was there a significant lack of coverage prior to Enron’s fall, but when Enron finally
declared bankruptcy, the majority of the media did not consider this big news. Despite the fact
that the collapse of Enron represented the downfall of the seventh-largest company in the
United States, many of the largest media outlets barely even mentioned the event. Following
the announcement, ABC, CBS, and NBC only dedicated two sentences during the evening
news to the event. Not only was the event not actively promoted on the evening news, but
Enron’s bankruptcy did not make the front page of the Washington Post, Boston Globe,
Philadelphia Inquirer, USA Today, Denver Post, or Detriot Free Press. Ultimately, despite
Enron’s declaration of bankruptcy, the media did not immediately provide extensive coverage
of the event, and widespread coverage did not occur until information regarding Arthur
Anderson, Enron’s accounting firm, and a potential political scandal were uncovered.
In addition, not only was the coverage of Enron’s downfall delayed and sparse, but the media
also presented conflicting viewpoints. For example, the treatment of Ken Lay, the chairman of
Enron, was handled differently by different media groups. In Houston, where Lay was one of
the most charitable donors to the city, the media scarcely focused blame on him. However,
Houston’s media did place extensive blame on Enron’s other senior executives. In contrast to
Houston’s sparing of Lay, Mother Jones, an alternative media source, consistently printed
articles discussing Lay as one of the central figures of the scandal. Thus, there was
discrepancy among media groups as to the extent of Lay’s involvement in the scandal. In
addition to the discrepancy regarding Lay’s involvement, the coverage surrounding the
potential political scandal associated with Enron also differed between mainstream and
alternative media groups. As Jimmy Myatt states in the article “Covering the Enron Story:
Playing Softball and Playing Catch-Up,” “Most of the mainstream press failed to ask
questions concerning Enron’s role in setting up the Bush Administration’s energy policy or
the company’s contributions to the political campaigns of Bush…” (Myatt). In contrast to the
mainstream media’s coverage, the alternative press, such as Mother Jones and The Nation,
printed stories on the political scandal as early as 2002. Essentially, the conflicting viewpoints
of differing media groups served as another means to confuse the public.
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Along with presenting conflicting viewpoints, the media’s coverage was further substandard
because they allowed Enron’s management to dictate the information given to the public. In
order to ensure that the desired message was conveyed to the public, Enron employed big
lobbying staffs and spent extensive amounts of money on investor and public relations. Enron
paid influential commentators as much as $50,000 a year to be a member of Ken Lay’s board
of advisors. With members such as William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, and Paul
Krugman, an economist and The New York Times columnist, the advisory board was an
instrumental tool in manipulating the media. Furthermore, Enron’s response to any opposition
to the company also shaped the information the media presented the public with. For example,
in response to questions raised by Bethany McLean, a Fortune magazine reporter, Enron did a
number of things to thwart coverage. To discourage further questions, Jeffrey Skilling,
Enron’s CEO, called McLean unethical and hung up on her when she called. In addition, Ken
Lay, the company’s chairman, called Fortune’s managing editor to complain, and the
company even went as far as to send Andrew Fastow, Enron’s chief financial officer, to New
York to tell McLean and her editors that Enron was still a healthy, thriving company. As a
result of Enron’s efforts, the company was effectively able to persuade the media to act as the
company’s “cheerleaders,” and the vast majority of the public remained unaware of Enron’s
true condition.
Following Enron’s declaration of bankruptcy and the onset of scandals involving Arthur
Anderson and the government, the media attempted to defend their lack of coverage by saying
Enron’s financials were too complex to decipher. As Jeff Madrick said in the article “Enron,
the Media and the New Economy,” many journalists attempted to hide “behind the fact that
the Enron debacle is so complex that the company’s misdeeds could not be readily
understood” (Madrick). However, this is not a viable excuse. Leading up to Enron’s downfall,
Enron’s profit margins were visibly low, and the company’s earnings were increasing rapidly
while the company’s cash flow was not. Thus, although many journalists do not have
extensive financial backgrounds, these signs should have been clear enough to indicate that
there was something signficantly wrong with the company, and as the two economists
Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, stated “while many transactions were concealed, there
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was enough public information available to raise serious doubt about the credibility of
Enron’s earnings” (Maidment).
On the other hand, although the media clearly missed a number of relatively obvious warning
signs, there were a number of factors that impeded the media’s coverage of Enron. While
there were some areas within Enron’s financials that indicated the company was not as
healthy as portrayed, much of Enron’s financials and business practices were “largely
impenetrable…mind-numbingly complex…deeply frusterating…mysterious” (Shaw).
Furthermore, when journalists attempted to investigate Enron, they were met with harsh
opposition. Enron employed an extensive lobbying staff and investor relations department that
went to great lengths to suppress any opposition to the company. In addition, another factor
that contributed to the media’s poor coverage of Enron was the September 11th terrorist
attacks. Less than one month after Skilling’s resignation, the September 11th terrorist attacks
occurred; consequently, most news organizations devoted the majority of their efforts and
resources to covering this event. Lastly, although the coverage of Enron was inconsistent at
best, it is important to note that there were a few critical articles published before its downfall.
For example, despite harsh opposition from many of Enron’s top executives, Bethany
McClean published an article in the March 5, 2001 issue of Fortune entitled, “Is Enron
Overpriced?” in which she began questioning Enron’s inflated stock price.
Overall, the media’s coverage of Enron was subpar at best. Not only did the media blindly act
as “cheerleaders” for the company, but they ignored a number of obvious warning signs as
well. Consequently, because the media ignored these early warning signs, they did not cover
Enron’s downfall until it was too late; many investors had already lost a signifant portion of
their investment by the time they were aware of Enron’s true condition. Moreover, not only
were the media slow to report on Enron, but when the media did finally publicize the event, it
did not receive prime coverage and many conflicting viewpoints were presented. The media
largely allowed Enron’s management to dictate what information was given to the public, and
Enron’s management often pressured reporters into presenting only positive information
about the company. Thus, in the end, as John Olson, an analyst with the Sanders Morris
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Harris Group, stated, “Enron was great at gaming the system and they gamed us on Wall
Street. They gamed the media. They gamed their accountants and they may have gamed their
lawyers. In the end, they may have even gamed each other” (Anderson).
Technology Bubble & The Savings and Loan Crisis
In addition to the poor coverage of the media during the downfall of Enron, the media also
failed in their coverage of the Technology Bubble and the Savings and Loan Crisis. During
the Technology Bubble,
The role of the news media in the stock market was not, as commonly believed, simply a
convenient tool for investors who were reacting directly to the economically significant news
itself. The media actively shaped public attention and categories of thought, and they created the
environment within which the stock market events we see are played out (Bhattacharya, Galpin
and Ray).

Thus, the media created the context in which the Technology Bubble occurred. Through their
coverage, the media were able to direct the attention of the public to technology stocks, and
ultimately convince investors that these stocks were worth investing in. Moreover, not only
did the media participate in convincing investors to purchase technology stocks, even when
there was no financial data to support this decision, but the media also produced conflicting
viewpoints throughout their coverage. As the authors of the article “The Role of the Media in
the Internet IPO Bubble” stated, “During the Dot-Com Era, the media tended to be overoptimistic when prices were rising but over pessimistic when prices were falling”
(Bhattacharya, Galpin and Ray). Instead of looking at factual data, the media simply reported
on the trends occurring in the general marketplace. In doing this, the media failed to provide
the public with an accurate depiction of what was really occurring within the technology
industry; they only exacerbated trends that were already occurring by providing additional
hype.
Similar to the coverage of the Technology Bubble, the coverage of the Savings and Loan
Crisis was also substandard at best. During the coverage of the event, there was a blatant bias
on televised news. When the three major nightly news broadcasts asked a total of 80 on-air
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sources for their views on the S&Ls between mid-December and mid-February, three-fourths
were government officials and one-fourth were financial industry spokespersons or private
analysts. Thus, no public interest spokespersons were given the opportunity to even comment
on the issue. Furthermore, when Ralph Nader and Jesse Jackson produced reports stating the
bailout should be the responsibility of the rich because they benefited the most from the
scandal, the media immediately dismissed the reports. For example, when Nader released the
report “Report to U.S. Taxpayers on the Savings & Loan Crisis,” it was not covered by any of
the three nightly news networks and no coverage occurred in the Washington Post or The New
York Times. In addition to the media’s failure to cover the viewpoints of public interest
spokespersons and the report’s of political figures such as Ralph Nader, most media also
failed to point out that the Savings and Loan Crisis was “rooted in financial speculation that
Reagan policies have encouraged” (Bond). Thus, the interests of the government were placed
before the media’s obligation to the public; the media failed to provide the public with
objective viewpoints in order to benefit parties such as the government. Overall, the media’s
performance during the Technology Bubble and the Savings and Loan Crisis was
unimpressive, and they failed to provide the public with accurate information.

WHAT THEN IS THE PROBLEM?
Although the coverage of past financial crises has been substandard at best, minimal coverage
of financial crises has still existed. Therefore, how is it possible that so many consumers were
unaware of the situation, both during the financial crisis of 2008 and past financial crises?
Was it only poor coverage, or were there other contributing factors?
One of the major contributors to the public’s failure to recognize the condition of the financial
industry is that “the reading public wants to read only what it wants to believe” (Roush).
During times when the market is performing well and investors are receiving high returns, the
public is not very receptive to the notion that the market may potentially go down and they
may no longer see the returns they desire. As Chris Roush states in the article Warnings, “It is
very hard to get the public’s attention for stories warning of complex financial risks in the
middle of a roaring, populist bull market” (Roush). Thus, investors would rather remain
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blissfully unaware than accept the potential for a decline in the market. Moreover, if the
public even took the initiative to read an article discussing the potential for a market
downturn, most “people would have said ‘Ha ha, maybe,’ and gone about their business”
(Roush).
Furthermore, a prime example of the public’s refusal to accept negative market outlooks
during a bull market is evident in the story of Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at
New York University. In 2006, Roubini gave a speech at the International Monetary Fund
warning that the United States would experience a burst in the housing bubble, an oil shock, a
steep decline in consumer confidence, and, ultimately, a profound recession. Upon giving this
speech, however, the audience laughed at Roubini’s warnings because at the time
unemployment and inflation was low and the economy was still growing modestly. As a
result, the audience felt Roubini’s warnings were unfounded, and they did not accept the
possibility of a downturn in the market. However, in the year following Roubini’s speech,
subprime mortgage lenders began to declare bankruptcy, hedge funds went under, and the
stock market declined substantially. Thus, despite the resistance Roubini faced, his
predictions ultimately became a reality, and, as economist Prakash Loungani stated, “He
sounded like a madman in 2006, but he was a prophet when he returned in 2007” (Mihm). In
the end, although the media clearly did not adequately cover past financial crises, it is
undeniable that the public contributed to its own ignorance. As Andy Serwer, the Managing
Editor for Fortune stated, “There’s plenty of greed to go around. Everyone’s complicit”; the
public is perfectly content remaining unaware of a potential market downturn so long as their
returns remain steady (Writer).
In addition to the public’s unwillingness to listen to negative news during a bull market,
another major contributor to this phenomenon is the fact that the audience of the financial
press is often comprised of the same people that the journalists are writing about. For
example, during the financial crisis of 2008, “A major part of the problem is that the financial
journalists who cover Wall Street are used to writing for Wall Street’s customers – the very
mortgage companies and financial institutions that were raking in millions from the bubble”
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(Schechter). Thus, in order to please these individuals and promote the sale of financial
magazines and newspapers, journalists will publish information that places companies and
organizations in a more favorable light. By creating a more favorable image of these
organizations, the individuals associated with them are more likely to purchase the
publication. Therefore, in order to avoid being cast aside within the media industry, much of
the financial press concedes to the demands of their audience and publishes articles that the
readers of the financial press find appealing.
Additionally, the poor coverage of the media is further enhanced by the media’s inherent
conflict of interest. As seen in recent years, the coverage of the media is often swayed by
increased compensation. For example, during Enron’s reign, the analysts of many investment
banks were persuaded to issue favorable reviews in return for investment banking business.
As David Shaw, a reporter for the LA Times stated,
Companies such as Enron have considerable leverage over them, saying (implicitly, if not
explicitly), ‘We support the analysts who support our stock,’ meaning they’ll give their lucrative
investment banking business to those firms whose analysts issue strong “buy” recommendations
for their stock (Shaw).

Furthermore, the idea that analysts often construct favorable reviews of companies in return
for monetary compensation is further demonstrated by the large salaries that analysts are paid.
Analysts are paid exorbitant amounts “not because they write nice reports with glossy covers.
It’s because they help generate fees for their firms by taking a very, very optimistic view of a
stock, even if they don’t necessarily believe it” (Shaw). Thus, because analysts have a vested
interest in the reports they produce, they have a tendency to deviate from the truth and create
inaccurate reports that better suit their monetary desires. Not only is the media’s conflict of
interest shown through its performance during Enron’s reign, but many of the investment
rating agencies, such as Moody’s, acted in this manner as well. The role of investment rating
agencies is to help investors better evaluate the risk in what they are buying. However, during
the bull market leading up to the burst of the housing bubble, many of the agencies “either
underestimated the risk of mortgage debt or simply over-looked its danger so they could rake
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in large profits during the housing boom” (Morgenson). Thus, as did analysts during the
Enron scandal, rating agencies, in order to benefit their own agenda, during the financial crisis
of 2008 also failed to provide investors and the public at large with accurate investment
information. As a result, although there was the appearance of information, the information
was of little value to the public because the media simply used it to benefit their own interests.
However, the media’s conflict of interest extends beyond that of monetary benefits; the media
have also often trades subservience for access. Alexander Dyck, an economist at the
University of Toronto, stated that there is a “systemic quid pro quo bias between journalists
and their sources, whereby journalists receive private information in exchange for a positive
spin on companies’ news” (Maidment). Therefore, the media are only relaying the
information to the public that the organizations want them to hear and any negative news
remains unheard. Furthermore, the tendency of the media to trade subservience for access is
also greatly amplified during economic bubbles. Because growth forecasts become
increasingly important to investors during bubbles, many companies are even more concerned
with spinning news to show a positive outlook and muting bad news. As a result, companies
use their ability to restrict journalistic access in order to limit the ability of the media to
discover potentially damaging information. Thus, journalists are increasingly forced to
comply with the demands of companies in order to gain information. Overall, “it’s no secret
that journalists trade access for soft treatment”; the media in today’s society is willing to trade
objectivity for access to additional information and monetary rewards (Rose). Financial
reporters became financial stenographers.
Not only is the media’s coverage compromised by their inherent conflict of interest, but it is
also tarnished because the media do not often like to admit when they are wrong. As Peter
Behr stated, “Journalists take pride in finding out answers to questions, not in being stumped
and misled” (Behr). Thus, the media enjoy touting when they are correct and uncover a
ground-breaking story, but they have a difficult time accepting their mistakes. As a result, the
media often have difficulty presenting a new viewpoint when evidence arises in contradiction
to their initial stance.
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In addition to the media’s inability to accept failure, their coverage is further deteriorated
because “the press doesn’t pay as much attention to some of these regulatory issues that have
more impact on the world” (Kurtz). In American society, the media are often more concerned
with political stories than business stories, even though events in the business arena often
have a wide reaching impact on society. For example, during the Enron scandal, the few
critical pieces that were written before the company declared bankruptcy focused mainly on
the alleged political scandal associated with the company. As Howard Kurtz states,
In February, the Los Angeles Times reported on the close ties between Lay and the president, noting that
Bush had flown on Enron jets during the campaign…In May, the New York Times quoted the federal
government’s top electricity regulator, Curtis Hebert Jr., as saying Lay had offered to support his continued
tenure if he changed his views on energy deregulation (Kurtz).

Furthermore, not only was the coverage prior to Enron’s downfall primarily focused on the
alleged political scandal, but the extensive amounts of coverage surrounding Enron after its
declaration of bankruptcy was still largely in regards to the political aspects of the situation.
As discussed in a television special on PBS in the weeks following Enron’s downfall “it’s
Enron all the time, thanks to the company’s ties to the Bush administration and its showering
of campaign money on Capitol Hill” (McLean, Madrick and Allen). Thus, despite the fact that
Enron’s downfall was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U. S. history, the majority of the
coverage regarding the event still focused mainly on the ties the government had to Enron.
Lastly, another major contributor to the media’s inconsistent coverage of financial crises has
been the decline in the fortunes of the newspaper industry. In 2008 alone, the newspaper
industry lost 13,000 jobs. Consequently, not only were there 13,000 fewer journalists who
could potentially cover the events unfolding in the financial industry, but it also increased the
level of competition between the remaining members of the newspaper industry as well.
Because members of the industry were increasingly fearing for their jobs, they became more
focused on covering stories that would “sell papers” and were not necessarily focusing on the
events that needed to be covered. Moreover, as Dean Starkman wrote,
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The disintegration of the financial media’s own financial underpinnings could not have come at a
worse time. Low morale, lost expertise, and constant cutbacks, especially in investigative reporting
– these are not conditions that produce an appetite for confrontation and muckraking (Starkman).

Thus, the characteristics of the newspaper industry at this time discouraged active
investigation of the events unfolding in the financial industry.
Overall, there are a number of factors that have contributed to the inconsistent coverage of
financial crises. The media’s inherent conflict of interest, both in terms of monetary rewards
and trading subservience for access, has ultimately resulted in a disservice to the public. The
public is no longer receiving factual and objective information. Instead, the public now hears
primarily what corporate America wants it to hear. Furthermore, because journalists dislike
admitting when they are wrong, the public increasingly receives inaccurate information. In
addition, the media’s tendency to favor reporting on political events has also hindered the
coverage of the financial industry. However, although the media are largely at fault for the
insufficient coverage of financial crises, the audience has contributed to its own ignorance.
During times of economic prosperity, the public is often complacent and blissfully ignorant.
The public is more content reaping the benefits of a booming economy than being concerned
with the potential for a future downturn in the market. Lastly, the recent difficulty of the
newspaper industry has also severely impacted the strength of the financial media because
there are fewer experienced journalists who are willing and able to report on the often
complex on goings of the financial industry. In the end, the poor coverage of financial crises
cannot solely be blamed on one party; the media and the audience have both played a role.

WHAT CAN WE DO AS CONSUMERS TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING
AGAIN?
There are a number of preventative measures that consumers of the financial press can take in
order to help prevent this failure from happening again. One of the most crucial preventative
measures that consumers should take is to increase their level of media literacy. In today’s
society,
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We’re continually bombarded with messages from newspapers and magazines, movie and
television screens, Internet websites, and chat rooms. We have to know how to filter out what we
don’t need or want and how to access and then interpret, analyze and evaluate what’s useful
(Trampiets).

Furthermore, it is increasingly important to be able to interpret, analyze, and evaluate
information presented by the media because most governments and businesses have extensive
public relations departments. With these departments, governments and businesses can
promote the “good news” into the public. As a result, the majority of the information the
media report as “news” comes directly from public relation departments and press releases. In
addition, becoming more media literate is also essential in understanding how structural
features, such as media ownership, influence the information given to the public; media
outlets often convey information that reflects the interests of the corporation they are owned
by. Ultimately, “media literacy is about asking smart questions and making smart choices; it’s
about using media selectively and reflectively” (Trampiets). In doing this, consumers will be
more accurately informed, and they will be able to better detect propaganda, censorship, bias,
and the impact of media ownership on coverage.
Not only is it important for consumers of the financial press to interpret and analyze the
information presented to them in order to see past the biased information of public relation
departments, but it is also important because Americans are becoming increasingly
responsible for their own financial security. Today, there are more Americans investing in the
stock market than ever before; nearly half of all American households invest. Moreover, since
the 1980s, the number of individuals investing in mutual funds has increased from one out of
every 18 to one out of every three people. Thus, having the ability to interpret and analyze the
financial press is crucial in order to make informed investment decisions. In addition, the
importance of this ability is further enhanced because more Americans are taking
responsibility for their retirement needs. Therefore, it is important that individuals make
informed investment decisions that will enable them to provide for their future.
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In addition to becoming more media literate, it is also essential that consumers of the financial
press accept that nothing is truly objective. Objectivity requires strictly “adhering to the
principals of fairness, factuality and nonpartisanship. It’s an attempt to get all sides of the
story, and to leave oneself out of it. It’s about being neutral” (Editor). Although reporters are
well aware of what it takes to remain objective, the objectivity of the media in today’s society
has greatly diminished. As an Atlanta editor stated, “The more a reporter inserts personality
and observation, the more objectivity is lost. As soon as the first words are typed, the
personality of the person at the keyboard comes through, even if just a little bit” (Editor).
Thus, many reporters are more concerned with “telling a story” and expressing their own
opinion than remaining neutral and presenting factual information. Furthermore, objectivity is
also diminished by the information the reporter chooses to leave out, either due to word count
limitations, accident, or circumstance. Ultimately, as shown by a survey conducted by the
Sacred Heart University Polling Institute, 67.9% of Americans think that “objective and fair
journalism is dead” (Lucas). Moreover, only 24.3% of Americans believe all or most of
reporting, and 86.6% of Americans think that journalists strongly or somewhat have their own
opinions and attempt to influence public opinion. Overall, “the media as a whole cannot be
truly objective about any story;” therefore, it is essential that media consumers recognize this
and take it into consideration when consuming information in order to better facilitate making
informed financial decisions (Lucas).
In the end, in order to help prevent future financial crises from occurring it is necessary that
consumers of the financial press must become more media literate and recognize that no news
is truly objective. By becoming more media literate, consumers will be able to better detect
propaganda, censorship, biases, and the effects of media ownership. Subsequently, consumers
will be able to formulate more accurate opinions and make more precise decisions. In addition
to becoming more media literate, recognizing that the media is never truly objective will
further consumers’ ability to make more informed decisions. In the end, it is essential that
consumers make an effort to become more media literate and to actively recognize that the
media are not objective in order to prevent financial crises, such as the financial crises of 2008
and the downfall of Enron, from happening again in the future.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the media’s coverage of the financial crisis of 2008, as well as past crises
including the downfall of Enron, the burst of the Technology Bubble, and the Savings and
Loan crisis, has been extremely limited. During these events, the media failed to provide
accurate coverage, and the minimal coverage that did exist was often biased and delayed.
However, the media’s failed coverage was not the only factor that contributed to the public’s
lack of awareness. Factors such as the public’s unwillingness to listen to the media also
contributed greatly to this phenomenon. Thus, in order to prevent these failures in the future,
consumers of the financial press must take action. They must become more media literate and
recognize that no source of information is truly objective. Therefore, in the end, the public’s
lack of awareness regarding catastrophic events in the financial industry is not the sole fault of
one party; the media and the public both are both at fault. Thus, in order to prevent this trend
from continuing, both the media and consumers of the financial press must take preventative
measures. Ultimately, without the dedication of both parties, this phenomenon will likely
continue and financial crises will continue to go unnoticed until it is already too late.
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